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Introduction
Toward a Feminist Constitutional Agenda
Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin
Women around the world increasingly resort to constitutional litigation to
resolve controversies involving gender issues. This litigation has involved
claims for political participation, freedom from discrimination and violence,
sexual and reproductive rights, employment and civic rights, matrimonial
and familial autonomy, as well as other social and economic rights. For
the most part, constitutional law scholars have analyzed this jurisprudence
doctrinally, conﬁning their research mainly to individual ﬂashpoint issues
such as abortion or afﬁrmative action. Such studies are usually framed by
national boundaries; and, when comparative, their reach is often limited to a
small number of countries sharing the same legal tradition. This explains the
need for a feminist analysis of constitutional jurisprudence in which gender
becomes the focal point and for a broader comparative constitutional law
approach that encompasses both of the world’s major legal traditions. Those
are the focal points of this book.
Not long ago a feminist constitutional law scholar asked: “Can consti-
tutions be for women too”?1 Cognizant of the dangers of overgeneralizing
about women’s experiences and concerns, she was cautious about respond-
ing afﬁrmatively. Nevertheless, her message was clear. Although women may
be un-, or under-, represented among the ranks of those who draft domestic
constitutions, we are not entirely without constitutional agency. Whether
constitutional language adverts or not to women, we still advance claims
for constitutional rights. And, despite legal theory’s conventional assump-
tions about deﬁning constitutionalism as “the relationship among a constitu-
tion’s authority, its identity, and possible methodologies of interpretation,”2
1 Donna Greschner, “Can Constitutions Be for Women Too?,” in Dawn Currie and B.
MacLean, eds., The Administration of Justice (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Social
Research Unit, 1986) 20.
2 Larry Alexander, ed., Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998) 1.
1
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feminist theorists have not hesitated to conceptualize it more contextually,
as illustrated by the feminist philosopher who concluded “the constitu-
tion we have depends upon the constitution we make and do and are.”3
Thus women activists, lawyers, judges, and scholars appear to agree that
what is at stake no longer is whether constitutions can be for women but,
rather, when and how to ensure that they recognize and promote women’s
rights.
The “when” question is easy to answer. Now. It is timely to assert, lit-
igate, protect, and promote the constitutional rights of women because of
the conﬂuence of two twentieth-century developments. One is scholarly and
the other juridical. In the ﬁrst place, feminist scholarship has begun to em-
brace the study of legal phenomena. Of course, analyzing law from the per-
spective of gender is by no means new. In the eighteenth century, Mary
Wollstonecraft issued her Vindication of the Rights of Women, a publication
that clearly entailed commentary on legal rules that impacted on women’s
lives.4 By the closing decades of the twentieth century, a number of schol-
ars from various countries had published treatises on feminist legal theory,
including therein works by the Norwegian scholar Tove Stang Dahl, British
scholars such as Katherine O’Donovan and Carol Smart, the American
scholar Catharine MacKinnon, and the Australian scholar Carole Pateman.5
Moreover, some contemporary feminist legal scholarship is comparatively
but not consistently constitutionally oriented.6 The burgeoning literature
on comparative constitutional law covers a wide range of topics, such as
constitutionalism, rights, judicial review, federalism, governance, and eco-
nomic development, while being virtually devoid of research that pertains to
women’s rights. In other words, there is a huge gap – a gender gap – in con-
temporary comparative constitutional analysis.7 The same cannot be said
3 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “The Idea of a Constitution” (1987) 37 J. Legal Educ. 167 at 168,
continuing: “Except insofar as we do, what we think we have is powerless and will soon
disappear. Except insofar as, in doing, we respect what we are – both our actuality and the
genuine potential within us – our doing will be a disaster” (emphasis in original).
4 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, with Strictures on Political and
Moral Subjects (London: John Johnson, 1794).
5 Tove Stang Dahl, Women’s Law: An Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (Oslo: Norwegian
University Press, 1987); Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, 1985); Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge,
1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodiﬁed: Discourses on Life and Law
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
6 Susan Bazilli, ed., Putting Women on the Agenda (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1991); Fiona
Beveridge, Sue Nott and Kylie Stephen, eds., Making Women Count: Integrating Gender into
Law and Policy-making (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000).
7 A striking exception is the recent publication of Fiona Beveridge, Sue Nott and Kylie Stephen,
eds.,MakingWomenCount: IntegratingGender intoLawandPolicy-making (Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd., 2000).
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of comparative law scholarship in general.8 Nor does it extend to the study
of historically disadvantaged groups other than women. Recently, for in-
stance, comparative constitutional law scholars not only examined contem-
porary ethnic group conﬂicts9 but also studied the legal claims of religious
communities.10
In the second place, and coincidentally with this spate of feminist legal
theorizing, have appeared constitutional doctrines that impact or have the
potential to impact on women’s issues. The same was not true for women
who entered the twentieth century. The constitutional rights of women re-
ceived little or no juridical recognition until well into the twentieth century.
Moreover, this holds true irrespective of whether a country is relatively new
to the world’s stage or whether its roots go back for centuries. It should come
as no surprise, therefore, thatmuch still remains to be done in the twenty-ﬁrst
century to promote the process of “constituting” (or recognizing, sustaining
and promoting) women’s rights.
This brings us to the “how” question, which is more a challenge than a
question. Writ large, the immediate question is how to use constitution mak-
ing processes and, more than anything, the existing constitutional judicial
processes to achieve gender equality for women. The challenge is complex
because feminists and judges emphasize different material facts, rely on dif-
ferent terminology, reason quite distinctively, and do not necessarily share the
same goals when they examine the issue of gender equality. Most feminists
believe gender equalitywill not be achieved until the subordination ofwomen
is overcome. In contrast, some jurists deny that women’s subordination is
real,11 whereas others question the value of relying on constitutional strate-
gies for redress.12 To give yet a further example, although legal reasoning
8 See, for all, V. Jackson andM. Tushnet,ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, University Casebook
Series (NewYork, NewYork Foundation Press, 1999); andN. Dorsen,M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajo´
and S. Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials, American Casebook Series
(St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2003).
9 E.g., Yash Ghai, ed., Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
10 Peter W. Edge and Graham Harvey, eds., Law andReligion in Contemporary Society: Commu-
nities, Individualism, and the State (Burlington, VI: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2000).
11 E.g., Gould v. YukonOrder of Pioneers (1991), 14 C.H.R.R. D/176 (Wachowich J.) at D/190,
discussing why the sex equality provision in the Canadian Constitution might not be “avail-
able to combat allegedly discriminatory behaviour against all women. In my view women,
as a group, are not what is commonly understood to be a ‘minority’ in Canadian society.
The intervener stated that a recent Yukon census showed that 53.1 percent of the population
was male, while 46.9 percent was female. Whether this constitutes a minority that can be
discriminated against is in doubt.”
12 E.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York:
Simon & Schuster Inc., 1990) 330: “I had taken the position that, except for this rational
basis test, the equal protection clause [in the American Constitution] should be restricted to
race and ethnicity. . . .There is unlikely to be much work for the equal protection clause to do
with respect to governmental distinctions between the sexes because legislators are hardly
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is invariably deductive, feminists are as likely, if not more likely, to reason
inductively. Under these circumstances, common sense suggests developing
the relationship between feminist theorizing and constitutional reasoning in
several stages, rather than thrusting them together and holding our breath
as we wait to see if the marriage will endure.
More speciﬁcally, we advocate developing a feminist constitutional
agenda, which like any good ordering device should admit of some degree
of ﬂexibility. At a minimum, however, this feminist constitutional agenda
should address the position of women with respect to: (i) constitutional
agency; (ii) constitutional rights; (iii) constitutionally structured diversity;
(iv) constitutional equality; and give special attention to (v) women’s repro-
ductive rights and sexual autonomy; (vi) women’s rights within the family;
(vii) women’s socioeconomic development and democratic rights.
This listing is lengthy. However, it would be even longer were it to con-
tain all the context- and fact-driven issues that could constitute an agenda
structured solely along feminist lines. Indeed, its length offers no consolation
to women who are lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered, women with disabil-
ities, and/or elder women who do not see their rights reﬂected on it. They
will assume their claims lie buried within the listed categories. Moreover,
this listing is also vulnerable to the criticism that some issues might overlap
more than one theme. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the virtue of
making our proposed feminist constitutional agenda as extensive as it is, lies
in the fact that it is signiﬁcantly more detailed than most of the agendas that
are designed from a purportedly “gender neutral” constitutional law per-
spective. Such scholarship tends to address issues as if they pertain either to
federalism and separation of powers, or to constitutional rights. Typically,
the latter research will be further bifurcated into studies focusing on one
of two main strategies for dealing with rights conﬂicts. The more popular
strategy is autonomy, which encompasses claims that range from privacy
claims to the collective claim of self-determination.13 Thus, when perceived
in terms of self-determination, autonomy is the rallying cry of many indige-
nous, racial, ethnic, and linguistic groups. On occasion, most of these rights-
seeking groups also turn to the other major strategy for managing rights
conﬂicts, which is equality. Although these three major constitutional law
categories – federalism, autonomy, and equality – might capture women’s
claims, they also might distort and/or impoverish them, viz. should claims
of democratic underrepresentation be subsumed under autonomy or equal-
ity, or are they sui generis? Also, with only three categories at their disposal,
likely to impose invidious discriminations upon a group that comprises a slight majority of
the electorate.”
13 Yash Ghai, ed., Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 1: “One of the most sought after, and
resisted, devices for conﬂict management is autonomy.”
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scholars might be tempted to portray the relationships among them as ad-
versarial, viz. treating pornography as a contest between the pornographers’
autonomy and the equality rights of women and girls, which would neglect
entirely the entitlement of the latter to self-determination or autonomy.
Thus, we propose to design a feminist constitutional agenda as a middle
course between the extensive and reality-driven delineation of issues that
feminist scholars advance and the more rigidly bounded, often threefold,
doctrinal categorization found in constitutional law scholarship. The main
purpose of this introduction is to raise some of the major questions that
should be addressed under each of the headings described in the hope that,
when approaching the different national experiences that are described in
this book, the reader will be able to identify the span of possible answers
and assess their practical impact. The reader will realize that the themes are
in fact drawn from the national chapters that follow. Not every theme is
found in every chapter, and some chapters may contain other themes that
have not been explicitly added to this agenda. Knowing that some themes
overlap, and that some themes should be but are not self-evident in our
listing, we invite feminist constitutional law scholars to continue what we
have begun by de- and reconstructing our agenda themes as part of our larger
project of encouraging judicial recognition of the constitutional structures
and rights necessary to overcome the subordination of women. Our primary
goal is, in short, to identify, sustain and promote the constitutional norms and
strategies that will achieve gender equality for women. To this end, we invite
feminist, legal, and other interested scholars to think about constitutions in
a gendered way.
The contributors to this volume have done precisely that. This book is de-
signed to explore these themes as they are manifested in the constitutions and
constitutional jurisprudence issued by the national courts in twelve countries:
Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Germany, India, Israel,
South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. These countries span
several continents, cover diverse legal traditions and collectively represent
constitutional regimes that were adopted over a period of almost three cen-
turies. Although the overall scope of this coverage matters, there was no
magic in the number of countries chosen. Rather inclusion was based on
balancing a number of structural features, including representation of the
major legal traditions (civil law and common law), governance structures
(monarchy and republic), legislative regimes (parliamentary and presiden-
tial), adjudicative mechanisms (constitutional courts and general courts),
and jurisdictional structures (federal unions and unitary states). Other fac-
tors that distinguish these countries include their racial, religious, linguistic,
and cultural demographics. As well, these particular countries derive their
constitutional rights from a wide range of sources including entrenched bills
of rights, unwritten principles, ordinary statutes, and international human
rights treaties. Arguably the more extensive the structural, social, and legal
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diversity of these countries, the more compelling the similarities, if any, that
crystallize from analyzing their jurisprudence.
Even though each national contribution should be perceived as part of
the larger enterprise of conceptualizing the themes on a feminist constitu-
tional agenda, each also stands alone as a chapter describing that country’s
constitutional jurisprudence as it pertains to women. Crucial to the selection
process was, therefore, the willingness of country contributors to examine
the role of women as constitutional agents, analyzing their engagement in
constitutional litigation and adjudication, as well as in constitution making
and amending processes. We also encouraged contributors to highlight the
most progressive element(s) of the constitutions and of the constitutional
jurisprudence that national courts have adjudicated on behalf of women’s
claims in the hope of encouraging strategical extrapolation.
More speciﬁcally, we asked them to discuss who makes constitutional
claims, what kinds of rights inform these claims, how these claims have
evolved over time, what kinds of arguments work in defense of these claims,
and how these claims relate to the larger social, economic and political is-
sues that contemporary countries are facing. We urged them to provide a
comprehensive reference to the most important case law and relevant con-
stitutional provisions, as well as a brief bibliography that could serve as
a guide for further research. The contributors, all of whom are academics
and/or advocates on behalf of women’s rights, remained true to their train-
ing as lawyers, responding both critically and constructively. Their chapters
illuminate their constructive critiques partly by addressing selected common
themes and partly by developing the most original themes that each national
experience offers in terms of constitutional gender jurisprudence.
Three caveats should be borne in mind. First, our feminist constitutional
agenda is just that, an agenda and not a recipe. We propose themes to open
this ﬁeld for further examination and not to foreclose alternative approaches.
While trying to identify some of the factors that are to be taken into account
in a gender-sensitive constitutional analysis and inviting the contributors to
reﬂect upon them in the context of their national experiences, aware of the
richness and intricacies of each constitutional system, we have purposefully
avoided drawing direct causal-effect conclusions that might have been right-
fully criticized as oversimpliﬁcations. Second, although we asked the country
contributors to emphasize constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence, we do
not intend to suggest that constitutional progress is synonymous with social
progress. In some instances, law may be more often an aspiration than a
set of binding norms; judiciary systems may be more or less reliable when
it comes to applying doctrine; and in some countries the doctrines relevant
to women’s rights are too new and/or fragmentary to be coherently system-
atized. Third, even as a study of this kind invites extrapolation from one
country to another, we recognize the need for carefully keeping in mind the
deep differences that exist between and among countries not only culturally
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but also in terms of their legal traditions. Legal traditions vary according to
the signiﬁcance they attach to constitutional law, to competing sources of
law including religious authorities, indigenous traditions, and international
law, as well as to judicial review.
women and constitutional agency
For centuries, states openly barred women from participating in civic life,
whether as voters or legislators, lawyers or jurists. Men also monopolized
constitutional activities. Not surprisingly, women’s initial forays into the
realm of constitution-making focused primarily on voting, although their
strategies differed. On the one hand, white women in twoAustralian colonies
were not only the ﬁrst to receive the franchise, but also in 1901 they be-
came the ﬁrst women to vote on a constitution. On the other hand, fol-
lowing decades of lobbying, in 1920 Americans became the ﬁrst to secure a
constitutional amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote. Although
these initial strategies were important, however, it is curious that they did
not lead to any further formal constitutional changes for women in either
country.
The embrace of formal equality and the explicit commitment to sex equal-
ity only became a general trend in postwar constitutionalism. Women’s role
in promoting those provisions is unclear. Given pervasive underrepresenta-
tion in legislative and constituent assemblies, it would not be surprising to
ﬁnd that their activities were limited. However, during the 1980s and 1990s,
women began to engage actively in processes of general constitutional re-
newal. For instance, not only did Canadian women lobby to strengthen the
sex equality guarantees newly entrenched in the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms (1982), but also women in Colombia successfully advocated for gender
equality and gender-related provisions in their new Constitution (1991), and
South African women actively participated in the process of drafting their
new Constitution (1996). Finally, by procuring an amendment (1999) that
requires gender parity in selected electoral contests, French feminists may
have portended a new era, one in which women could seek speciﬁc gender-
related constitutional amendments as needed rather than only during times
of general constitutional change.
The foregoing suggests womenwho are active in feminist movements have
begun to identify constitutions and constitutional change as relevant to our
lives. With more comparative analysis, we may better understand when to
initiate constitutional change on behalf of women, whether to intervene in
changes already underway, what strategies are appropriate to each context,
and how best to connect the international with the national fora, how to
engage other women in these processes, and what results are most likely to
undermine the prevailing patterns of political, social, and economic subordi-
nation of women. Thus, politically speaking, there is much to learn from the
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roles women have already played in the constitution making and amending
processes and initiatives.
The process of litigation offers women ways of developing and changing
the meaning of constitutional norms. The country chapters in this volume
exemplify this process at work, tantalizing us with questions of measure-
ment (how active have women been in litigating?) and quality (what claims
do women litigate and with what consequences?). More speciﬁcally with re-
spect to the level of women’s litigious activity, what institutional mechanisms
are most likely to overcome conventional barriers to accessibility by helping
women as a group to avail themselves of constitutional tools? The possibili-
ties include the design of standing rules and class action rules, as well as the
provision of funding for litigation, of ofﬁcials who institute actions such as
ombudpersons, or of organizations that speciﬁcally protect women’s rights
in constitutional litigation such as the Women’s Legal Education and Action
Fund (LEAF) in Canada or the more controversial Commission for Gender
Equality in South Africa.
Understanding women’s constitutional agency requires an understanding
of the types of claims that women bring, and the constitutional strategies on
which they rely. There is no question that, although the strongest emphasis
has been on equality provisions, gender-related litigation has proceeded un-
dermost of the other rights-based provisions aswell as under some federalism
provisions. In this context, it is worth considering whether speciﬁc groups
of women are more litigious than others and if so, how this impacts on the
way in which doctrine is shaped. It also is interesting to observe to what ex-
tent men’s agency has had an impact on women’s. Moreover, gender-related
doctrine may be affected in cases in which women are defendants or not
even parties, as for example in most sexual assault prosecutions. Finally, any
assessment of the quality of women’s constitutional litigious agency would
not be complete without an assessment of the difference, if any, that is made
by having women on the ﬁnal appellate courts that decide constitutional
matters.
In sum, women’s constitutional agency involves lobbying, legislating, lit-
igating, and adjudicating. Although all of these roles are open to women, as
the different chapters show, our entry is not commensurate with our num-
bers, suggesting invisible but real public constraints, perhaps not unlike the
proverbial glass ceiling in the private workplace. Nor should womenmistake
bestowals of nice-sounding principles for the efforts of agency. As the Turkish
experience shows, men can use women’s equality for their own purpose. In
other words, progress and agency need not go hand-in-hand.
women and constitutional rights
Constitutional rights provide women and other rights seekers with the tools
to challenge state activity in the courts. They offer more protection than
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statutory and other nonconstitutional rights which may not constrain leg-
islation. Also controversies involving statutory and other nonconstitutional
rights are not necessarily resolved by courts; often they are designed to be
heard at least initially, if not ﬁnally, by administrative tribunals or govern-
ment ofﬁcials.
Nevertheless, arguably there is one important respect in which statutory
and other nonconstitutional rights might be perceived as offering better pro-
tection to rights seekers, especially rights seekers who are unaccustomed to
the methodology of legal reasoning. Put simply, while constitutional pro-
visions tend to have a greater visibility and seem to permeate more easily
the general legal culture than statutory rights do, statutory rights are often
detailed, making their meanings more transparent and accessible to rights
seekers. In contrast, constitutional rights are usually expressed in terms of
abstract generalities so that their meanings are dependent on the interpreta-
tions judges have ascribed to them. Thus, understanding constitutional rights
involves understanding the claims litigants have raised and judges have ad-
judicated. In fact, this may make less relevant the varying degrees in which
rights can be constitutionally framed, which, as the national cases addressed
here show, range from extremely detailed formulations to very limited or
even nonexistent.
In any event, the country chapters reveal that women’s constitutional
rights claims have encompassed a wide array of grounds. Some of these
grounds have been unique to women from individual countries. For instance,
women have constitutionally reacted against the desecration of sacred land
in Australia, police failure to warn about a serial rapist in Canada, forc-
ing contraceptives on female prisoners as a condition of conjugal visits in
Colombia, gendered prayer rights in Israel, the restitution of conjugal rights
in India, the order of family names in Germany, or male preference rules in
the inheritance of nobility titles in Spain. But many other grounds have been
raised more generally. For example, women have often used constitutional
instruments to ﬁght against pregnancy and employment discrimination, do-
mestic violence, political underrepresentation, sexual harassment, military
service discrimination, sex crimes and/or their accompanying procedures, or
unfair marriage, divorce, and succession rules.
Given their breadth, it is striking that few if any of these grounds are ex-
pressly prohibited in contemporary constitutions. This lacuna forces women
to ﬁgure out constitutional strategies to react against the liabilities involved,
ground by ground, and country by country. Having to contend on a case-
by-case basis for subsuming speciﬁc prohibitions within the more abstractly
worded provisions found in most constitutions is resource intensive and en-
ergy depleting. Moreover, many women simply cannot afford to undertake
such an approach. Thus, the insights of comparative analysis suggest feminist
and other legal scholars should reassess the current practice of refracting con-
stitutional rights through a myriad of grounds. The ﬂexibility of expressing
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constitutional rights abstractly may or may not assist women. One of the
dangers in silence is that it forces women to rely on the more generic equal-
ity provision, but doing so forces women to phrase their claims always in
comparative terms. Because the parameters for the comparison are provided
by men’s experience, presumably, this strategy has inherent limitations.
However, constitutional rights are no panacea. Constitutional rights es-
pouse, and are expected to espouse, the fundamental values of a nation and
this has both good and bad consequences for women because courts are
prepared not only to uphold but also to limit women’s claims in the name
of these fundamental values. For instance, as we will see, this has worked
to women’s disadvantage when restrictive abortion laws were challenged
in countries where the courts responded by upholding restrictions, or even
by strengthening them, in the name of the foetus and the value of life. In
other words, the antithetical consequences that ensue when constitutional
rights also serve as constitutional limits should be factored into any consid-
eration of the feasibility of adopting more explicit or grounded expressions
of women’s constitutional rights. Also, freedom of speech has traditionally
been asserted against attempts to limit the harm women suffer because of
pornography.
No analysis of women’s constitutional rights would be complete without
referring to the sphere of application of constitutional rights. Some coun-
tries, virtually all of the common law countries analyzed here, restrict the
application of women’s challenges to state (or public) activity, whereas oth-
ers, mostly of the civil law tradition, allow women to rely on constitutional
rights to challenge injustice and discrimination in the private sector, including
the family, schools, workplace, or the media. This distinction between coun-
tries that require state action and those recognizing the “horizontal” effect
or Drittwirkung of constitutional rights is especially relevant to women. It
evokes the public/private controversy that fuels much of feminist theory. Of-
ten the most serious forms of discrimination are those that women encounter
in the private sphere. Nevertheless, those countries that strictly adhere to the
constitutional state action doctrine often have general antidiscrimination leg-
islation addressing systematically the various forms of discrimination that
women encounter in civil society so that, in practical terms, the difference
might not be so dramatic.
Finally, some consideration should be granted to constitutional hermeneu-
tics as well. Have different methods of constitutional interpretation a gender
impact? Time may make a difference here. Presumably, if the constitution
is an old document written at a time when women’s subordinate status was
accepted as the natural order of things, and if the courts prefer an original-
ist or textual approach rather than a “living tree” or teleological approach,
this may have a negative impact on women’s constitutional position. Also,
the different relevance constitutions attach to international human rights
instruments and supranational law can have a clear impact on women’s
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constitutional status. Here again, the evidence drawn from our chapters
seems to suggest such relevance is accorded more signiﬁcance in civil law
than in common law countries and that in those constitutional regimes that
have accorded a special place for international norms in the constitutional
order, this has indeed made a signiﬁcant impact on the gender sympathies
of the constitutional bench.14 As we will see, some constitutions expressly
incorporate international law as domestic law. Costa Rica even grants it
superior legal force to that of the constitution. More common, however, is
the recognition of the need to interpret constitutional rights in the light of
relevant international or supranational law. CEDAW is, for instance, often
invoked and European Law is sometimes very relevant to constitutional in-
terpretation in EU Member States, like France, Germany, or Spain. How
does this impact the constitutional status of women? When speciﬁc judicial
bodies have the competence to interpret the international or supranational
law at stake (such as the European Court of Human Rights or the European
Court of Justice) and to bind national constitutional courts to receive such
interpretations and to incorporate them to their own interpretation of the
national constitutions, interesting questions arise concerning which becomes
the ﬁnal authority to which women can turn.
women and constitutionally structured diversity
Althoughwomen have participated in revolutionary activities gender conﬂict
has never caused a national revolution. Indeed, there is little evidence that
gender conﬂict has inﬂuenced the design of the constitutional structures that
promote national unity and postpone revolution. Instead, economic, cul-
tural, and religious conﬂicts have dictated the choices of constitution mak-
ers in selecting their country’s form of governance (whether monarchy or
republic), territorial principle (whether federation or unitary state), and ju-
risdictional approach (whether to recognize customary or religious laws).
Accordingly, feminist scholars are constrained to examining the impact on
women of these various constitutional structures and the diversities that un-
derlie them.
For instance, the choice between monarchical and republican forms of
governance seems gendered because the vast majority of the world’s mon-
archs have been and are men. Nevertheless, that is not always the case
and also the rule of primogeniture, or male preference succession that pre-
vails in many monarchies is indistinguishable from similar male preference
leadership rules or choices to which various republics adhere. Seldom have
14 On the topic, see R. Rubio-Marı´n and M. Morgan, “Constitutional Domestication of Inter-
national Gender Norms: Categorizations, Illustrations, and Reﬂections from the Nearside of
the Bridge,” in K. Knopp, ed., Gender and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
[2004].
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republican leaders been female. In sum, the real question is what constitu-
tional objective is served when male preference rules directly or indirectly
structure institutions of governance, and will the gender neutrality of the
most recently adopted constitutions make any difference?
When nations choose federation over unitary status as their territorial
principle, usually it is for economic reasons, often attached to geographical
considerations although sometimes ethnocultural conﬂict also plays a role,
as happens in Canada or India. From the perspective of women, however,
the major consequence of this choice is often to allocate “private” matters
to the regional entities rather than to the national level. For instance, it is
common to ﬁnd that family law becomes a matter for regional concern,
and frequently employment law follows suit. Criminal law is, in contrast,
sometimes a national and sometimes primarily of regional concern. These
and other territorial distributions of legislative power suggest the importance
of examining their impact on women, particularly from the standpoint of
feminist theorizing about the public/private split.
Without doubt the structural choice about which feminists have been
most vocal is the decision to recognize customary or religious jurisdiction
over certain relationships, often including those which are the most intimate
and intense, such as marriage, divorce, custody, property, and succession.
Nevertheless, feminist responses to these jurisdictional choices have not been
monolithic; rather, they have been context speciﬁc. For instance, as we will
see, many Australian and Canadian feminists have supported the recogni-
tion of legal rights for indigenous peoples, particularly the efforts indigenous
women have made to identify and assert their customary rights. However,
the recognition of personal religious laws in India, of religious laws in Israel,
and of customary and religious laws in South Africa is more controversial.
In these countries, feminists have not hesitated to identify some disadvan-
tages women experience under these religious and customary jurisdictions,
and to argue for the necessity of greater harmonization with women’s con-
stitutional rights. Finally, in a country such as Turkey, which has adopted a
policy of secularism in spite of its overwhelmingly Muslim population, the
ban on women wearing religious headscarves in universities has caused fem-
inists to differ. Comparative constitutional analysis signals thus the necessity
for examining the impact on women of governmental or judicial decisions
to recognize or assimilate religious and/or customary laws.
women and constitutional equality doctrine
Most constitutions, especially if they have been recently drafted, explicitly
prohibit sex or gender discrimination, and/or guarantee equality rights to
men and women or to male and female persons. Pragmatically speaking,
the promise of these provisions is clear. Because the oppression of women
remains a worldwide phenomenon despite some national variations, these
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provisions are available to support women’s equality claims (in fact, many
constitutions also explicitly approve of positive discrimination in cases where
historic discrimination is being remedied). Although the equality provisions
do not preclude men from claiming their protection, effectively they were
drafted to protect women. The idea is so widely spread that even in coun-
tries without generic sex equality provisions in their constitutions such as
Australia, Israel, or the United States, there is jurisprudence pertaining to
women’s constitutional right to equality. All are, in other words, past the
moral and philosophic preliminaries of whether andwhy to identify women’s
equality as a constitutional matter. What remains are the more pragmatic is-
sues of the what, when, and how of the constitutional adjudication of sex
equality claims: What does sex equality mean? When can women claim in-
fringement of their constitutional right to sex equality? How should courts
remedy sex inequalities?
Quite independently, the contributors to this volume approach these ques-
tions from the same discursive starting point. They analyze the national con-
stitutional jurisprudence as if sex equality had more than one meaning. Two
doctrines prevail, although jurists do not always employ the same terminol-
ogy as scholars. One is formal equality; the other, separate but equal. Both
doctrines rely on theAristotelian notions of treating alikes alike, and unalikes
unalike. Accordingly both focus on identifying the relevant differences and
similarities, whether biologically or socially determined, between men and
women as groups. Where they differ is in their emancipatory strategies. For-
mal equality assumes the sex of a person reveals nothing about individual
worth or autonomy; its main objective is to create a gender neutral legal
order, which turns out to be one in which women are treated just like men.
In contrast, its nomenclature suggests separate but equal doctrine empha-
sizes respect for and the value of women’s differences, while promising to
ensure they do not result in worse treatment.
Whatever the doctrine formally embraced, the same kinds of issues arise.
Thus formal equality courts have struggled to accommodate pregnancy dis-
crimination and afﬁrmative action by treating them as limited exceptions,
while separate but equal courts have found it difﬁcult to distinguish legisla-
tive stereotyping or paternalism from the less debilitating manifestations of
protective or symbolic legislation. Taken collectively, these doctrines portray
sex as an abstract conceptual category that is vulnerable to the excesses of
judicial discretion; and more important, both focus on open and direct dif-
ferentiation between the sexes, thereby failing to identify discrimination that
is embedded in gender neutral or gender speciﬁc legislation. Each of these
critiques is exempliﬁed, where pertinent, in the country chapters.
However, the country contributors also constructively advert to the exis-
tence of a third sex equality doctrine. Most contributors use the term “sub-
stantive equality” to denote this third doctrine. Unlike the other two equality
doctrines, it is not obsessed with identifying similarities and differences
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between men and women (to build upon them the “similarly situated test”),
nor with trying to classify them as biological or socially constructed. Sub-
stantive equality tries to identify patterns of oppression and subordination
of women as a group by men as a group on the understanding that most
sex discrimination originates with the long history of women’s inequality in
almost every area of life rather than inhering in sex as a conceptual category.
Ultimately, therefore, the goal of substantive equality is to transform social
patterns of discrimination, partly by uncovering the inequalities embedded
in gender neutral laws and partly by challenging schemes that differentiate
women by offering us only paternalistic beneﬁts. Unfortunately, even under
this doctrine there is hardly any way of getting around the objection that
some of the “beneﬁts” or “advantages” that the doctrine tries to extend to
women rely on traditionally male deﬁnitions of the good life. At the same
time, some of the goods at stake are so basic (think of life, physical integrity,
shelter, and food) that they can be assumed to be a part of anybody’s con-
ception of the good life.
Although some national courts have never adverted to substantive equal-
ity, it is possible that some of these national differences are semantic. In other
words, there may be other ways of referring to the third meaning of equality
in constitutional litigation. Be that as it may, the delineation of these three
doctrines not only has timing and remedial consequences but also poses is-
sues about limits. What follows is, therefore, a brief delineation of some of
the questions raised by adopting the different doctrines of equality.
With respect to timing, the country jurisprudence conﬁrms a pattern in
which reliance on the separate but equal and formal equality doctrines often
precedes the invocation of substantive equality doctrine. Canwe indeed iden-
tify general trends in this regard? Does this mean that the earlier doctrines
have historically limited functions? If so, can these limitations be attributed
mainly to their focus, which is on direct or intentional discrimination rather
than on discrimination that is indirect or effects based? What happens when
substantive equality appears in the national jurisprudence? Can the three
doctrines coexist? What are the tensions that come about? What happens if
the tensions are not faced or resolved?
What remedial implications attach to the different equality doctrines?
Remedying discrimination and inequality is undoubtedly complex. In exer-
cising judicial review, national courts may choose among various options
including: striking down legislation and denying the beneﬁts or privileges to
everyone; expanding legislative beneﬁts or privileges to the excluded group;
or denouncing the discriminatory legislation while deferring to the legisla-
ture to make changes. Comparative constitutional analysis permits us not
only to ask about the remedial strategies that national courts have adopted in
cases where women (or men) allege sex discrimination, but also to compare
these remedial responses cross-nationally. Within the parameters of substan-
tive equality jurisprudence alone, this approach encourages us to ask: Does
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gender matter? Does context matter? Does the nature or scope of the beneﬁts
or privileges matter?
What does the national jurisprudence reveal about the limits of the dif-
ferent equality doctrines? As we will see, the country chapters suggest that
three contexts are most apposite to examining these limits: afﬁrmative ac-
tion, protective legislation, and men’s discrimination. With respect to afﬁr-
mative action, what explains different national responses to it, in itself and
as applied to speciﬁc realms? What national standards control the validity of
afﬁrmative action? What limits, if any, are imposed to exclude measures that
beneﬁt individual women while negatively impacting on women as a group
because they are paternalistic and have stigmatizing effects or because they
sanction sexist stereotypes? Are afﬁrmative action measures accepted when,
whatever their long term effects, they compensate the present generation of
women for actual disadvantages they currently face? How is the necessity
for afﬁrmative action justiﬁed – by the rhetoric of equal opportunity or that
of equality of results? What is the connection between substantive equality
and afﬁrmative action? Does a commitment to substantive equality, as op-
posed to formal equality, mean conceptualizing afﬁrmative action more as a
fulﬁllment of equality rather than as an exception to it?
Protective legislation has become a pariah in countries that subscribe only
to formal equality. However, this does not obviate its existence; nor does it
necessarily evoke the same constraints in countries imbued with the substan-
tive equality approach. Moreover, protective legislation poses a particularly
poignant problem for women in countries which are in transition to a new
constitutional order. Although we rely on substantive equality doctrine to
identify and abolish paternalistic and stigmatizing legislation, nevertheless
some laws provide women with beneﬁts or privileges that are hard to re-
linquish. Because this issue is most sensitive in countries in transition from
regimes that were oppressive towardwomen, it is appropriate to ask whether
the courts have made allowances for relevant exceptions. For instance, who
should pay the costs when the generation claiming the retention of those
double-edged beneﬁts is the generation caught in the middle of a democratic
transition? Might the older generation not be doubly punished, ﬁrst in liv-
ing under an oppressive regime and then by the subsequent emancipatory
laws that deprive them of the compensation and protection that they had
legitimately come to expect? What role does and should the doctrine of
substantive equality play to resolve these questions?
How are the different equality doctrines equipped to remedy men’s
discrimination? How often and in what contexts do men raise constitu-
tional claims based on gender discrimination? Related to that, how are
men helping to shape the meaning of sex discrimination? The different doc-
trines provide different answers. For instance, formal equality identiﬁes any
differential treatment that beneﬁts women as discriminatory against men,
whereas substantive equality might characterize the identical situation as
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nondiscriminatory if its effect were to remedy disadvantages that women
face. Or, again, measures that privilege women and not men may meet the
separate but equal test while failing the substantive test for women’s equal-
ity because they provide women with paternalistic beneﬁts. Irrespective of
whether the suspect measures are scrutinized to ensure they do not backﬁre
against women, the question remains as to whether men should avail them-
selves of equality doctrine to access those beneﬁts. Are there genuine cases
of male sex discrimination wherein men are denied equal material or non-
material advantages because of gender roles that disadvantage them? What
have the various national practices been? Has formal equality served this
purpose, as for example when men have claimed their right to experience
the beneﬁts and burdens of paternity as fully as women experience the ben-
eﬁts and burdens of maternity? Have the courts made relevant distinctions
between the different claims presented by men?
Finally, irrespective of which doctrine judges apply, they must relate it to
the prevailing concept of discrimination and, on occasion, to other consti-
tutional rights and freedoms. These relationships give rise to various issues,
as the following questions illustrate. Must discrimination affect all women
equally in order to qualify as such and, if so, with what consequences? Do
national courts recognize intersectional discrimination, that is discrimina-
tion based on more than one prohibited ground, or must women choose
only one ground (think of sex vs. aboriginal status, race, caste, or religious
identity)? What are the consequences for sex equality of relying on a concept
of discrimination that was shaped on grounds other than sex? Do the tradi-
tional liberal rights and freedoms – such as freedom of expression, freedom
of religion, privacy, due process, the right to a fair trial, and other procedural
guarantees in criminal law – limit the constitutional right to sex equality?
Are these tensions recognized? How are they resolved?
constitutionalizing women’s reproductive rights
and sexual autonomy
Very few constitutions advert to reproductive rights even though they are
vital to women as individuals and as a group. However, in most countries
with constitutional justice there are a number of cases involving reproductive
issues that are not speciﬁcally denominated, such as abortion, in vitro fertil-
ization, contraception, and sterilization. Because these processes were (and
some still are) criminalized or otherwise regulated, litigants have resorted
to more generalized rights to challenge their constitutionality. Comparative
analysis of this jurisprudence will reveal whether distortions have resulted
from reclassifying these reproductive claims.
The abortion jurisprudence is particularly apposite to illustrate the com-
plexities induced by having to argue reproductive rights claims from a default
position. Many countries have criminalized abortion subject to one or more
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exceptions (e.g. therapeutic, rape survivors, medicalized procedures). In the
absence of abortion rights, litigants are forced to turn to a broad and di-
verse range of rights to sustain women’s entitlement to control their own
bodies, including security of the person, liberty, equality, privacy, free de-
velopment of one’s personality, physical integrity, human dignity, physical
and moral integrity, and freedom of thought and belief. Comparative con-
stitutional law scholars should examine how these alternative rights were
conceptualized, whether they differ, where they overlap, how easy or difﬁ-
cult they made it to argue abortion claims, what distortions they posed for
such arguments, and what consequences they had for women’s reproductive
rights.
Irrespective of which rights were argued on behalf of women, however, in-
variably a claim is made, usually by the state, for constitutional protection of
the right to life of the fetus. Indeed, this claim can be and has been advanced
in IVF cases. Such fetal right to life claims raise four issues. First, do all consti-
tutions explicitly protect the right to life and when they do, how is this right
conceptualized? Second, are fetal claims always subsumed under this right
and when they are, how is this argument sustained? Third, what is the rel-
evance of arguing about fetal rights in cases where women’s reproductive
rights claims are the basis for challenging the constitutionality of a law?
That is, do judges rule that women have reproductive rights before deciding
whether these rights are trumped by the right to life, or do they ignore re-
productive rights issues and focus only on fetal claims? Fourth, do judicial
resolutions of the foregoing issues – interpretation of the right to life, analy-
sis of fetal claims and approaches to women’s reproductive rights – correlate
with the outcomes in the cases, given they range from decriminalization al-
beit subject to regulation in some countries to continuing criminalization in
the others?
Future comparative law studies may explore the constitutionality of reg-
ulating speciﬁc features of the abortion process, including counselling, fund-
ing, parental or spousal notiﬁcation, and sex selection, as well as considering
whether states might have a duty to provide abortion facilities.Moreover, the
reproductive jurisprudence involving contraception, sterilization, and IVF
merits examination partly for intrinsic reasons and partly because it may
be instructive for abortion claims. For example, the constitutionality of reg-
ulating access to IVF as in Costa Rica, or of denying it to lesbians as in
Australia or divorcees as in Israel, not only impacts on women’s autonomy
as a group but also has consequences for our equality rights since much of
this litigationwas conducted under this constitutional rubric. Asmany of our
country contributors recognize, it is increasingly important to acknowledge
that equality analysis also is relevant to abortion issues. Thus comparative
law scholars should analyze equality as well as autonomy and privacy when
they examine the constitutional mandates that are most likely to inform
women’s reproductive rights jurisprudence.
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Abortion is not the only issue in which constitutions have been more
commonly used to obstruct than to facilitate women’s emancipation. Sexual
offences, too, represent a site of controversy about which comparative con-
stitutional law scholars would be hard pressed to deny that the entrenchment
of constitutional rights has detrimentally affectedwomen.Whether criminal-
ized or otherwise regulated, sexual offences – including rape, prostitution,
pornography, adultery, honor killings, hate speech, sexist speech, and sexual
harassment – have created a veritable industry of constitutional litigation
for the criminal defense bar. Relying on traditional legal rights such as the
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the right not to be sub-
ject to cruel and unusual punishment, as well as on freedom of expression,
equality rights, and the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, male
defendants have not hesitated to challenge the constitutionality of various
sexual offences and the evidentiary or procedural rules pertaining to them.
To illustrate, not only have men challenged the criminalization of rape in
countries such as India and statutory rape in countries such as Canada and
the United States, they also have invoked constitutional rights to argue for
liberal access to the sexual history of the rape survivor and to her therapeutic
counseling records in Canada, as well as to justify more lenient penalties for
marital rape in Colombia.
As the victim-survivors, women are all but invisible, enduring these con-
stitutional challenges without having a litigation status from which to re-
spond. Despite this disempowerment, women have demanded that we be
accorded constitutional protection for our sexual autonomy. Sometimes vic-
tims’ lawyers make these assertions in court; sometimes prosecutors can be
encouraged to voice them, albeit usually with the objective of protecting
the state’s interest in the impugned legislation. Either way, the discourse has
been framed in terms of various rights including equality, life with dignity,
freedom of expression, and honor. Not only should this jurisprudence illu-
minate how national courts address tensions among constitutional rights,
but also it should yield a picture of which rights they favor. In sum, when
women claim the right to constitutional protection of sexual autonomy, can
national courts hear our voices?
women’s rights and the constitutional deﬁnition
of the family
The family is often the object of explicit constitutional protection. However,
as the following chapters show, the presence of constitutional provisions
referring to the family does not determine whether countries have constitu-
tional jurisprudence pertaining to it. Rather, such jurisprudence pervades all
of the country chapters. In other words, the family has acquired a constitu-
tional veneer, whether by political and/or judicial decree. Thus it is important
to examine how this constitutionalization of the family has affected women’s
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rights. The idea that constitutions should (implying can) stay out of the home
is indeed a myth.
From a comparative law perspective such studies raise a number of is-
sues. Writ large, we need to understand how constitutions and constitutional
doctrines shape and are shaped by national conceptions of the family. For
instance, is curial discourse restricted to recognizing only formally married,
sequentially monogamous, heterosexual couples or have the national courts
been asked to accordmatrimonial status or at least some family beneﬁts (e.g.,
survivors’ pensions, protection of children born out of wedlock, succession,
and property rights) to common law or de facto families, to single-parent
families, to polygamous unions, or to gay men and lesbians? Can constitu-
tions really be neutral about family arrangements? In rendering these deci-
sions, moreover, have courts acknowledged their speciﬁc impact on women’s
well-being?
More speciﬁcally, how do judges decide cases in which they are asked
to treat wives or mothers differently from husbands or fathers? Collectively
speaking, there are many such cases and they cover a wide range of sub-
ject matters, including family or children’s surnames, income tax deductions
and attributions, disposition of matrimonial property, survivors’ pensions,
inheritance, divorce, alimony, custody and support of children, restoration
of conjugal rights, adultery, adoption, and domestic violence. This jurispru-
dence should enable scholars to identify the constitutional justiﬁcations that
convince national courts to sanction the division of family roles on the basis
of gender.
There also are other issues that merit attention. For example, when consti-
tutions make families the object of collective rights protection (typically, by
sanctioning the right to family privacy), does that impair the rights of women
as individuals? How do courts balance the interests of children versus those
of the father and/or the mother? Does the embrace of the doctrine of the
horizontal effects of constitutional rights open a path for ﬁghting against
unfairness and oppression inside of the home? Is domestic violence a con-
stitutional offense? How, if at all, do constitutions conceptualize women’s
domestic labor? What is the constitutional debate surrounding the impact
of personal, religious, and customary family law on women’s rights? What
role, if any, does federalism play in the constitutionalization of the family?
Ultimately, feminist scholars should also ask: Does constitutional doctrine
sustain the ﬁction of the split between the private and public?
women’s socioeconomic development and democratic
rights in the constitution
There is considerable overlap between socioeconomic issues and those
to which family relationships give rise. Questions such as whether or
not women’s domestic labor is valued, who is expected to bear the
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responsibility of child raising, whether or not women heads of family are
protected, whether marriage gives husbands control over women’s property,
and rules on alimony and child support have the greatest impact on women’s
socioeconomic well-being. However, it is worth asking some additional
questions.
Given that virtually in no country are women men’s socioeconomic
equals, the ﬁrst obvious question is whether constitutions speciﬁcally ad-
dress women’s socioeconomic needs and whether the kinds of protections
constitutions contain can backﬁre against women, especially within market
economies. For instance, the Spanish Constitution prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in employment but some other constitutions, like the Colombian,
the Costa Rican, and the Turkish explicitly provide for special protection
for women workers, which, as the case law discussed in those countries’
chapters shows, raises the question as to whether such clauses end up being
freedom restricting or enhancing.
Moreover, it would seem that the horizontal application of fundamen-
tal rights would have a clear impact on women’s socioeconomic well-being
as, together with the family, the workplace, and educational institutions are
two of the most frequent scenarios for discrimination against women in civil
society. It is thus important to ask whether sex discrimination at work by
private employers is a constitutional offence. In relation to that is discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy, or sexual harassment, conceptualized as a
constitutional offence?
Any feminist constitutional agenda that looks at results, and not just at
intentions and formalities, should also address the constitutional status of
socioeconomic rights in general, as opposed to ﬁrst- and second-generation
rights. Even when phrased in gender neutral terms, the rights to housing,
education, health care, social security, and food, recognized by some consti-
tutions, like the South African, have a gender impact, and will do so, as long
as poverty has the face of a woman; for example, consider debates such as
the one currently taking place in India, as to whether to make education a
fundamental right by amending their Constitution are gendered.
Needless to say, women’s political status is crucial to the overcoming of
their social and economic subordination. Most women can vote and serve as
elected political representatives, although few constitutions advert to these
democratic rights. There are some exceptions. The United States Constitu-
tion is exceptional insofar as it guarantees both sexes equal voting rights;
similarly the South African Constitution is unique in describing the com-
position of the National Assembly in terms of both genders. In addition,
several countries have taken positive steps to ensure that women’s demo-
cratic rights are recognized as possessing a participatory, as well as a formal
legal, dimension. They have constitutional provisions and/or jurisprudence
permitting or requiring quotas aimed at increasing women’s political repre-
sentation and participation in the public realm. In some countries, like in
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France, these have only come about after a highly disputed constitutional
amendment process.
Constitutional law scholars should compare these participatory provi-
sions and analyze the jurisprudence pertaining to them to identify their
underlying conceptions. Although somemay be perceived as temporarymea-
sures necessary to facilitate women’s incorporation into the political and
other public domains, others may be intended to redeﬁne democratic repre-
sentation more permanently according to a mirror representation approach.
In addition, we need to examine the effect of context on adjudication. That
is, have national courts reacted differently to quota, reserved seat, or parity
legislation depending on whether it applies to political party candidacies,
electoral lists, the judiciary, or public sector employment? Does it matter
whether the quotas are speciﬁed, how they are derived, if they are manda-
tory, whether they also apply on grounds other than sex, or whether they
contain explicit or implicit exonerations or sanctions?
Citizenship is also more broadly deﬁned by the civic entitlements – both
rights and duties – that the full members of any society can exercise. In terms
of rights, we need to ask whether constitutions protect women’s equal right
to enjoy and to pass on membership status, given cases in which states have
treated women unequally with respect to aboriginal, religious, citizenship,
or residential status. In terms of duties, and related dignitary beneﬁts, one of
the major issues revolves around the constitutionality of exempting, exclud-
ing or limiting women’s military, public, and jury service. Finally, no study of
civic duties would be complete without addressing the issue of whether con-
stitutions and constitutional doctrines treat women’s reproductive capacity
and unpaid domestic labour as social assets.
constituting women: the gender of
constitutional jurisprudence
In what follows, the country contributors take very seriously the task of re-
sponding on a selective national basis to the questions raised by our feminist
agenda. Not only do their answers enrich our understanding of the posi-
tion of women in constitutional jurisprudence but also they ﬁll a huge gap in
the literature on comparative constitutionalism, the gender gap. Individually
and collectively they challenge our acceptance of particular constitutional ar-
rangements forcing us to question what may have seemed simply inevitable
or obvious. “Broadening our perspective,” as a feminist comparative consti-
tutional law scholar recently argued, “may enable us to ask better questions
and to better understand the answers that we ﬁnd.”15
15 Kim Lane Schepple, “The Agendas of Comparative Constitutionalism” (2003) 13 (2) Law&
Courts: Newsletter of the Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science Association 5
at 22 online: Law and Courts Newsletter Web site <http://www.law.nyu.edu/lawcourts/pubs/
newsletter/spring03.pdf> (date accessed: 11/11/03).
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